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Bureaucracy versus Professionalism in Higher Education
(2014)
Melvyn L. Fein, Ph.D.
Kennesaw State University
Abstract
In recent years the size of college administrations has grown twice as quickly
as the size of faculties. This is symptomatic of a larger problem. Higher education has
become excessively rule-bound and in the process bureaucracy has infringed upon the
discretion that professors require to teach with the requisite professionalism. The
problem is especially acute with respect to what has been described as
“accountability.” Strangely this demand rarely seems to be applied to organizational
supervisors, whereas it has been used to discipline members of the faculty. In order to
understand what has gone wrong, we need to contrast the bureaucratic and
professional models of organization as they pertain to colleges and universities. When
we do, it becomes plain that what may suit an industrial enterprise is misplaced if
comprehensively applied to academe.
A College Bubble?
Several short years ago the United States experienced a housing bubble. The
value of American homes dropped precipitously when too many mortgage loans
went toxic. Today many observers fear that something comparable is occurring visà-vis American colleges and universities (Reynolds, 2012). A large number are
afraid that these too have been oversold. With costs going up and quality going
down, they worry about the future institutions that are critical to our shared wellbeing.
Sometimes mentioned as problematic, but rarely appreciated vis-à-vis the
extent of damage it has done is the on-going bureaucratization of academe. In
recent years, schools both large and small, public and private, have witnessed a
surge in administrators. In many cases, this has resulted in larger numbers of

supervisors on campus than professors. Indeed, the number of administrators has
grown almost twice as quickly as that of professors (Ginsberg, 2011).
This, unfortunately, has produced a skew that is threatening the integrity of
higher education. Faculty members who, first and foremost, perceived themselves
as scholars and teachers once ran our nation’s colleges. In fact, the term college
originally referred to the fact that they collectively set the standards by which these
schools operated (Pedersen, 1997). Now, however, professors are apt to be treated
as employees who are bound to do the bidding of their hierarchical superiors. That
this is so is exemplified by the much higher salaries administrators are able to
command.
All in all, this introduces rigidities and displaced goals that that redound
against the interests of both students and society. Instead of bureaucratization
creating educational efficiencies alleged by its supporters, it actually undermines
the essence of what colleges and universities should be. They become less about
expanding advanced knowledge and transmitting this effectively to the younger
generation and more about following arbitrary rules. The upshot is that their
reputations have been tarnished and they are less socially valued—ergo the
potential bubble (Fein, 2014).
The Bureaucratic Model
Sociologists owe their fundamental insights into the nature of bureaucracy to
Max Weber (Gerth and Mills, 1946). His model of how this form of organization
operates still provides the foundation of contemporary understandings. It,
therefore, makes sense to review the basics of his archetype before exploring how it
applies to higher education. Weber assumed that this mode of doing business was
essential to promoting efficiency and rationality. Not only was it regarded as
effective in controlling large numbers of persons such that they could coordinate
their efforts in pursuing a common goal, but it was taken for granted that it would
ensure that they when about this in the most productive manner available.

2

Bureaucracy was about calculating the most effective ways of achieving
desired endpoints and then making sure these were implemented. The methods
might deprive individuals of some of their freedom, but this “iron cage” was
compensated for by the wealth it produced; wealth that could then be shared with
those who helped produce it. This approach to social organization was, therefore,
liable to succeed in comparison with seat-of-the pants traditional methods. In direct
competition, the one would swamp the other with superior products created at
lower costs.
Bureaucracies are said to achieve their magic by incorporating six crucial
features. First, they specify a shared organizational goal. Nowadays this is often
operationalized as a mission statement to which all employees are required to owe
their allegiance. Second, they break down the tasks to be performed into a
functional division of labor. Rather than every participant do everything, complex
operations are split into smaller segments in which it is possible to individuals to
attain significant proficiencies. As Adam Smith (1776) argued centuries ago with
respect to his famous pin factory, this sort of specialization tends to increase
efficiency.
Third, the tasks identified as separable must then be assigned to particular
persons who have been vetted to ascertain their suitability. These persons are
subsequently delegated “defined offices,” which is to say “jobs” that are fleshed out
in “job descriptions.” This way the participants can be clear as to their
responsibilities, while at the same time being able to respect the responsibilities
allocated to others. Fourth, these assignments may then be coordinated, and
supervised, via a specified hierarchy of authority. Particular individuals are
appointed to oversee what others accomplish. These persons are allowed to
exercise greater power, but only if they do so within the parameters of their
positions. This way all involved understand who is to report to whom—and about
which activities. No interference in a subordinated personal life is to be allowed. As
a result, conflict is reduced, while synchronization is improved.
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Fifth, because Weber believed in rationality, he also believed that some
modes of operation were recognizably more efficient. These procedures and
methods were, therefore, the ones the organization should adopt. They were to be
identified by those in authority, who then demanded that those they oversaw
implement these. Individual discretion was thereby to be limited in favor of what
was later described as “scientific management” (Taylor, 1911). Sixth, and last, the
complexity of these operations required that they be assiduously documented.
Extensive files and records were to be maintained so that those in change could
keep track of what was done—or perhaps left undone. Functioning essentially as
the memory of the organization, these documents would allow everyone to remain
on the same page without having to rely on the imperfect memories of individuals
who might come and go.
Bureaucratization, by these means, provided an avenue to standardization
calculability and predictability (Ritzer, 2011). Individuals up and down the chain of
command could, as a result, be held accountable for keeping up their end of the
enterprise. Because it was known what they were supposed to achieve and also
because what they achieved was monitored, their successes and failures could be
accurately quantified. This then became a channel for imposing disciple. Thanks to
the fact that what the parties accomplished was measurable, if they failed to
measure up, they could be sanctioned. The result would be to motivate superior
efforts from workers who might otherwise be inclined to shirk.
So effective has this approach been in practice that bureaucracies have
become the norm in almost every large-scale organization. In government agencies,
industrial giants, commercial operations, military units, and religious communities
they have provided a coherence and effectiveness that their less organized
predecessors could not equal. The question at arises is thus: Is this the only way to
effectively organize large organizations? And more specifically: Is it the appropriate
way to organize colleges and universities? Is there perhaps another model of
coordinating large-scale endeavors that might serve more effectively?
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The Professional Model
Too often it is assumed that bureaucracy is the sole avenue whereby large
enterprises can be controlled—and this includes contemporary higher education.
Moreover, it is frequently taken for granted that the lone alternative is the arbitrary
and capricious rule of autocrats. While it is true that bureaucracy did, by and large,
supplant the unenlightened and sometimes venal decision-making of traditional
leaders, there is, in fact, another mode of coordination and control available. Usually
associated with independent agents, it too is capable of harmonizing and enhancing
the efforts of large numbers of participants. That paradigm is the professional
model (Larson, 1977).
Professionalism has been with us since the European Middle Ages. It was
then exclusively applied to physicians, lawyers, and clerics. The social contributions
of each of these occupations were deemed so essential that that those who entered
them were thought to require a “calling” directly from God. They were to do what
they did, not because they sought personal wealth or glory, but because they were
dedicated to achieving objectives sanctified by the Lord himself.
Nowadays this religious motivation has generally lapsed among those
designated professionals. Although they continue to be regarded as performing
important work, their dedication must therefore come from another source. On the
whole, this commitment derives from the contemporary nature of professionalism.
What these individuals do, the knowledge and skill they require to do it, and the
means by which they acquire these attributes, combine to shape unique professional
identities. As a consequence, who they become in the process of entering their
professions so shapes their personal motives that like their predecessors they too
can be trusted with crucial responsibilities (Hughes, 1958).
Let us therefore review the fundamental aspects of professionalism
(Greenwood, 1957). First, professionals are the custodians of complex, and
frequently, theoretical knowledge. What they are required to understand is so
demanding that it is typically beyond the capacities or the commitment of most
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humans. Moreover, this is normally esoteric knowledge. In other words, it is
usually not the sort of material that would be acquired during the course of ordinary
living. Furthermore, professionals themselves are generally responsible for
expanding the boundaries of their respective specialties. Many of them engage in
research and erudition such that they become the originators—and the guardians—
of critical information. Physicians provide a classic example of this sort of
commission. They know far more about how the body works, why its functions
sometimes become disturbed, and how these may be returned to normal operation.
Second, as a result of their advanced understandings, professionals are
delegated authorities that are denied others. Thus, they are allowed to engage in
activities that were others to attempt, they might get into legal difficulties.
Physicians, for example, are permitted to prescribe medications and to perform
operations that in the hands of laypersons would be deemed criminal. In addition,
professionals are accorded a level of respect and deference that are withheld from
their less knowledgeable peers. People not only go to doctors when they are ill,
they listen to their recommendations and follow these prescriptions to a degree
they would not were they issued by friends and relatives. Doctors, in short, are
treated as superior beings who deserve to have power and influence in the areas of
their specialty.
Third, the unique knowledge that confers this singular esteem is derived
from a demanding period of socialization and from immersion in a professional
culture. Professionals are not born; they are made. Their innate abilities may be
genetic, but these must be cultivated if they are to be converted into a professional
status. Nowadays, for most professionals, this process begins with a lengthy
interlude of formal education (Fein, 2014). Because there is so much to learn, many
years intentional study have to be devoted to incorporating these materials. In the
case of physicians, this generally includes four years of undergraduate studies, four
years in medical school and perhaps another four years of residency and advanced
training. Part of this process will include an internship whereby the student doctor
gets to practice his/her new vocation so at to internalize its requirements.
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This, however, does not end the process of professionalization. Upon
achieving their new status, professionals are required to participate in a community
of other professionals. They are expected to attend conferences, to read
professional literature, and to submit to the judgment of their peers. In brief, they
will be exposed to professional sanctions for the entirety of their careers. If they do
not keep up, and if they do not perform their responsibilities with the requisite
discipline, their professional reputations may be in tatters. This might not seem
terribly significant, but for individuals who have devoted many arduous years to
attaining an admired status, it can be devastating. In the end, this helps sustain their
motivation to be good at their “calling.” Consequently, most do not require a
spiritual commitment in order to maintain their efforts.
Fourth, because professionals usually know more, and care more, about their
chosen fields, they are allowed a large measure of self-discipline. When
professionals stray from their responsibilities, they may be held to account to their
peers. Accordingly, unethical doctors may find themselves found guilty of
malpractice by other physicians. As a result, the can be stripped of their licenses to
practice medicine—or perhaps to be granted privileges by a hospital. Professionals
also have considerable control over hiring other professionals and awarding them
advanced positions. Because professionals are the ones best situated to judge the
competence of their colleagues, their decisions generally carry more weight that
those of laypersons. It is well understood that their special knowledge provides
insights others do not possess.
Fifth, and finally, professionals are required to subscribe to a code of ethics.
Precisely because they have so much control over their own activities, they are
expected to maintain an allegiance to higher standards. These are to be deeply
ingrained and to guide the day-to-day decision-making of professionals if they hope
to remain in good standing. For physicians, this entails living up to the Hippocratic
oath and above all refraining from doing their patients any harm. Other
professionals have similar protocols in which they are instructed and to which they
are obliged to conform. It is, of course, well understood that professionals often fail
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to honor these demands, and that they may even bend over backwards to protect
their peers from the mandatory penalties; nevertheless, these ethical standards
exercise considerable influence. Once again, to violate them would place a
professional’s hard-won status in jeopardy.
To put the matter succinctly, professionals tend to be self-motivated experts
in their areas of concern (Kohn and Schooler, 1983). They are internally driven to
be unusually competent at their respective tasks and therefore can be trusted to be
self-policing. This means that professionals are allowed to be self-supervising.
Historically, they have been independent practitioners whose expertise and
dedication were considered so great as to permit a great deal of independence.
Who, after all, was going to ensure that doctors and lawyers lived up to their
demanding obligations if not themselves? Ordinary workmen could be overseen to
make certain that they complied with a supervisor’s demands, but what nonmedical or non-legal supervisor had sufficient knowledge so as to determine if a
professional’s responsibilities had been adequately met?
In addition, were professionals denied this independence, what sorts of
individuals would be motivated to endure the grueling socialization needed to enter
these fields? One of the most powerful reasons for becoming a professional is to
exercise discretion over one’s work (Simon, 1947). To interfere with this control
and place the professional within the same sort of iron cage as the bureaucratic
underling eliminates the freedom that confers higher status and therefore the
incentive to pursue a special expertise. Bureaucracy, on the other hand, requires a
routinization that is not possible in activities with large numbers of uncertainties.
These tasks demand an ability, and a willingness, to exercise competent discretion
that are unlikely to be sought if they bring no special rewards. What is worse, those
not personally motivated to exercise competent discretion are apt to be
incompetent. If they do not personally care about doing a good job, the chances of
their doing one are not very great.
The professional model therefore stands in stark contrast to the bureaucratic
model. It to provides control over critical activities, but it does so via significantly
8

different channels. The Weberian model employs hierarchy and precisely defined
rules in order to achieve compliance with activities that meet complex
organizational goals. The professional model, in contrast, employs personal
motivation and individual discretion to accomplish similar ends. Neither may be
totally sufficient to realize every desired objective, but within the spheres where
they are most relevant they generally produce acceptable results. Thus, within the
kind of industrial organization Weber had in mind, a bureaucratic form of
coordination may be superior, whereas within more complex and variable
operations a professional form of coordination might be preferable (Bok, 2013).
Furthermore, there is no reason why the bureaucratic and professional
models cannot work in tandem. Even within a single organization some activities
can be bureaucratized, while others are professionalized. Given the different sorts
of mentality that are involved, this may result in an uneasy alliance; nonetheless it
can be a workable one. Indeed, this may well be the case within higher education.
Bureaucrats and professionals can be—and frequently are—at odds. Each may seek
to intimidate the other, yet each may be best suited for their own unique
responsibilities. There may, however, be a great deal of sniping along the borders,
as well as concerted efforts to engage in organizational imperialism. This latter
seems to be the case in higher education where bureaucratic administrators are
currently engaged in encroaching on areas that have traditionally been within the
professional mandate (Ginsburg, 2011).
Bureaucracy within Academe
Colleges and universities are no longer small places (Thelin, 2011). They
have far outgrown the intimate precincts of their ancestral roots. For example,
Harvard, when it was in its infancy, boasted a few dozen students and a handful of
professors. Everyone knew everyone else and both academic and housekeeping
decisions could be presided over by faculty members in concert. They could talk
things over and promulgate regulations, let us say, about living arrangements.
Those days, however, are long gone. Some colleges, to be sure, remain tiny, but the
most influential of contemporary schools have student bodies in the tens of
9

thousands and faculties in the many hundreds. This precludes the kind of decisionmaking that was once common.
The upshot is that it is no longer feasible for college professors to oversee all
activities needed to maintain organizational integrity. If faculty members are to be
competent in their specialties, they cannot supervise the day-to-day operations of,
let us say, student dormitories. To do so would take so much time and effort that
little would be left over for research and/or pedagogical preparation. As a result, all
large colleges and universities delegate these operations to non-academic
personnel. These are employees of the university, but they are not part of its
academic core.
These non-academic tasks include everything from overseeing dining rooms,
to collecting student fees, to building new structures, to policing the grounds, to
cleaning the bathrooms, to supervising parking, to soliciting funds from alumni, to
complying with federal regulations, to settling the details of the college budget, to
buying books for the library, and to acquiring athletic equipment for the school’s
teams. Without such housekeeping operations, colleges would grind to a halt.
These chores may not be sexy, but they are essential. Nonetheless, most of these are
not particularly complex in their day-to-day operations. Deciding to put up a new
classroom building may be complicated, whereas keeping it clean is more
predictable. As a consequence, these activities are suitable for bureaucratization.
There are other administrative activities that are more closely related to
teaching and research, but that are also fairly routine. These may impinge directly
on what professors do, but are better achieved by bureaucratic means. One of these
is student registration. Were professors to be directly involved in the nuts and bolts
of signing students up for classes, they would be swamped in detail. Yes, they can
advise students, and yes they can authorize over-rides, but making sure that a
students bills have been paid or that prerequisites have been met can be time
consuming. By the same token, assigning rooms to particular classes requires a
centralized system. Professors cannot be allowed to choose their own rooms or the
times their classes will meet. Were they to do so, anarchy would reign. Where and
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when classes would take place would be unpredictable, with the consequence that
teaching and studying would suffer. As seriously, conflicts between faculty
members would be endemic. Disputes over rooms would be the norm, with the
sometimes already contentious atmosphere of colleges campuses becoming toxic.
Only relatively neutral arbitrators, e.g., bureaucrats, can preserve schools from this
sort of disaster (Fein, 2014).
Then there are decisions that require both administrative and faculty input.
Many of these entail curricular decisions. No school can teach everything to
everyone. A certain level of triage is indispensible. But who should engage in this?
Administrators have a better grasp of the available resources and often of the
demands of external agencies such as state and federal governments, whereas
faculty member generally have a better grasp of what can, and needs to be, taught.
The solution has often been what is termed “shared governance.” Faculty members
will sit on committees that make recommendations, which are usually honored by
administrators who have the final say. Frictions frequently develop, but these are
usually manageable (Riley, 2011).
Less manageable, however, has been the administrative assumption that
bureaucrats are ultimately responsible for the quality of the education a college or
university provides. Much as industrial executives believe it is their responsibility
to ensure the quality of their products, college presidents, provosts and deans
assume that they must make sure that what happens in the classroom meets the
expected standards. They, therefore, demand “accountability” (Wildavsky, et al.,
2011). Professor’s feet must be held to the fire so as to make certain that they do a
competent job. If this requires that administrators promulgate the appropriate
standards, that they regularly measure whether faculty members are complying
with these, and that they sanction those who fail to conform, they assume this is
their duty. As hierarchical superiors, they believe they must impose appropriate
rules and regulations and then make certain these are enforced. Without them, they
are convinced the organization’s goals would not be met.
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Needless to say, most faculty members resent being treated as if they were
working on an assembly line. They believe, although many would not put it in these
words, that their professionalism is being violated. Most do not agree that
administrators have the right to engage in this sort of close supervision and regard
it as an unhelpful form of meddling.
Professionalism with Academe
College professors view themselves as professionals. They believe they are
the equivalent of doctors and lawyers—and that they have been since at least the
time of the medieval European university. When they securitize what it takes to be
a professional, they conclude that they more than meet these requirements. As a
consequence, most feel disrespected when they are not accorded the traditional
rights associated with being professional (Ginsburg, 2011).
A majority of professors would happily point out that they are experts in
demanding modes of theoretical knowledge (Hutchings, et al., 2011). Whether they
are chemists, mathematicians, sociologists, economists, or historians, they are
convinced that they know far more about these subjects than do laypersons.
Moreover, they are aware that they and their peers are engaged in expanding the
boundaries of their respective disciplines. No one can teach at a contemporary
college without being aware of the demands to “publish or perish.” Prospective
academics understand that if they are to be hired by an institution of higher
education they must be prepared to participate in scholarship and that if they do
not, they may either be denied tenure or promotion. To fail to keep up and to
continue learning is to become a virtual outcast—to become what is derisively
referred to as “dead wood.”
Moreover, for attaining advanced knowledge professors expect to be
awarded social power. Indeed, to a large degree, this is the case. First, they are
allowed to teach what they know to their students. In this, they are regarded as
authorities in their particular areas of expertise. Because they are widely believed
know to significantly more than their students, they are awarded deference in the
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classroom. They also get to grade these students. The professor, on the basis of
his/her expertise is allowed to decide who has learned and who has not. He or she
also gets to choose what will be taught and how this will be presented. Beyond this,
a professor may be accorded deference outside the classroom. Laypersons
frequently seek his or her opinions and he or she may even be hired as a consultant
on projects where the appropriate expertise can make the difference between
success or failure.
Next, professors are acutely aware of the demanding socialization they have
undergone and the community of scholars in which they are embedded. They know
that even before they could apply for a job teaching college that had to complete a
sound undergraduate degree and then go on to fulfill the requirements for a
doctorate. Not only did this entail succeeding in rigorous courses, but they also had
to pass comprehensive exams and complete an innovative dissertation to the
satisfaction of recognized scholars. Most know that only half of those who begin this
program eventually receive a degree because the unrelenting effort and high
standards they must endure require levels of ability and commitment that many
aspirants do not possess.
Professors are also acutely aware of the scrutiny they receive as members of
a professional community. They understand that if they do not attend conferences,
or keep up with the professional literature, or write articles that are accepted by
peer-reviewed journals, they will be deemed second-rate by their fellow
professionals. Even after they have obtained tenure they are motivated to retain
their expertise, and probably expand it, because if they were not, they would
disrespected by the people they put in so many years seeking to impress. It must be
remembered that college professors are human and thus are gratified when they are
appreciated and dismayed when dismissed as inept.
With respect the self-governance associated with professionalism, faculty
members likewise fit the paradigm. Because they are the experts in their respective
disciplines, they have a huge say in who gets hired and promoted at the college level.
They also, thanks to tenure decisions, get to say who will remain on board. This
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means that administrator’s have relatively little input about these matters, beyond
confirming faculty verdicts. Administrators may be able to make a professors life
miserable, but the steps needed to dismiss a faculty member who has not engaged in
blatantly immoral conduct (such as stripping naked in class) are difficult to manage
with out the cooperation of his or her colleagues.
Lastly, professors have codes of conduct. Each of their disciplines will have
professional associations that set standards they are expected to meet. These, like
medical codes, are promulgated in the belief that they should discourage activities
that harm those outside the field. The idea is to make sure that a professor’s
authority is not abused to the detriment of others. Nowadays most schools also
have institutional review boards (IRBs) on which professors evaluate research
proposals to make certain these will not injure those studied or affected by a study.
All in all, professors regard themselves as the self-motivated experts that
professionals are expected to be. They therefore believe they deserve to be
delegated the authority that has historically been accorded to professionals. This
includes control over their academic work. As the persons best qualified to do the
jobs they are assigned, they believe they must be permitted to self-supervise. In the
past, professionals, such as physicians, have been allowed to make decisions that
others are less competent to make. As a consequence, professors believe that this
same authority should apply to them.
Professionalism versus Bureaucracy in Academe
Given the conflicting attributes of bureaucracy and professionalism, the
question is how can the two divide up their authority within college precincts.
There can little doubt that as of this writing there is a great deal of friction between
the two models. While both are absolutely essential in accomplishing the mission
assigned to our colleges and universities, there is substantial disagreement about
where the line should be drawn. College administrators and professors come to
very different conclusions. Each side sees things from its own perspective and
concludes that its prescriptions best serve the health of higher education.
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In recent years the balance has been tipping toward the bureaucrats
(Reynolds, 2012). Although most of college administrators begin their careers as
academics, a large proportion ultimately comes to identify with their bureaucratic
roles. Acutely aware of their organizational responsibilities, they often lose sight of
the independent functions of their presumed subordinates. Furthermore, as earlier
indicated, over the last several decades the number of administrators has soared.
Escalating at almost twice the rate of the professors, in many instances there are
now more administrators on campus than faculty members.
Worse still, in many instances the only way for a professor to obtain a
substantial increase in income is to become a bureaucrat. Especially at mid-level
schools, the bonus for becoming an administrator can double a person’s salary. The
point is that the incentive is now to opt out of teaching and research in favor of
becoming a supervisor. A secondary implication is that this can give administrators
an inflated sense of worth. Measuring their value in terms of dollars, they conclude
that must be smarter and more insightful than their underlings.
As a consequence, many administrators assume that it is their duty to
improve the quality of education that their schools provide (Christensen and Eyring,
2011). They must therefore make certain that what the professors teach is both
appropriate and well delivered. As a result, there has been a scramble to impose
what are designated “best practices.” Much as in the manner of the now discredited
scientific management, efforts are made to identify the single best way to teach.
This then is to serve as a template from which diverse faculty members are to take
their cue. Just as Weberian superiors are asked to devise the appropriate rules and
procedures for their organizations, college presidents, provosts, deans and
department chairs assume it is incumbent upon them to do the same for professors.
Utterly forgotten in this supposed rush for efficiency is that there might not
be one best way to teach (Ambrose, et al., 2010). Different professors may find that
different techniques are more suitable for them. Because people differ in their
personalities and abilities, so may what they can comfortably implement. Similarly,
disciplines and colleges differ in the types of students they address and therefore
15

how these individuals best learn. What is more, students themselves differ and as a
result may benefit from a diverse set of teaching styles.
As significantly, the professional model places control over many crucial
decisions in the hands of the professional. In the college setting, this translates into
the professor deciding what should be taught and how it should be presented. In
fact, as a self-motivated expert in the discipline he or she teaches, he/she is better
situated to determine what should happen in the classroom. How, indeed, are
administrators who come from different disciplines to make such choices? What
makes a dean who was trained as a political scientist think that he/she knows better
how to teach psychology than a psychology professor? The odds of this are not
good. Although professors can be extremely uneven in their pedagogical abilities,
placing administrators in charge is only likely to water down what is achieved.
Standardized practices, whether labeled “best” or not, are apt to be too generalized
and shallow to be truly inspirational.
Furthermore, to take the discretion out of the hands of the professors is to
rob them of the motivation that makes professionalism so powerful an
organizational modality. If what faculty members do, and how they do it, is too
extensively determined from above, they are likely to become bored and frustrated.
Instead of making improvements based on their own expertise, they are then liable
to forego developing innovations they may not be allowed to use. As it happens, one
of the best ways for professors to stimulate students is for them to teach about their
own specialties. Because they care about these matters, their enthusiasm is bound
to be infectious. On the other hand, when deprived of this opportunity by cookiecutter programs all are likely to suffer. They will go through the motions, but the
cutting-edge learning that historically made a college education distinctive will have
been extinguished before it is able to ignite many minds.
As if this were not sufficiently discouraging, when bureaucrats seek to
impose their brainchildren on a docile professoriate, they compound the damage.
When convinced that their ways of teaching are superior, they frequently conclude
that they have a duty to see that these are executed. Just as industrial managers
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caught up in a Theory X mentality assume workers are lazy and will shirk their
responsibilities unless they are closely supervised (Gouldner, 1954), so
administrators who assume that faculty members will evade hard work if they can
are apt to believe they must force professors to do their duty. This mind set has
given rise to the “accountability” movement. The point of this crusade is to look
over faculty shoulders and then punish them if they fail to perform. Presumably if
they are left on their own without the fear of sanctions, they would do as little as
possible. In essence, they are not really self-motivated professionals who can be
delegated authority for their own activities. They must, as a result, be governed
from the outside, which means that professors must regularly prove themselves to
their administrative bosses (Wildavsky, et al., 2011).
The upshot is that professors are increasingly required to document their
achievements (Ginsburg, 2011). They must thus find ways to demonstrate that their
students are learning what they are supposed to. As a result, tedious reports are
written, redundant post-tenure reviews are endured, and empty-headed research
projects are authenticated. The problem with this approach is that it quickly
devolves into a ritualistic game. Because the instruments used are generally poor
indicators of what is taking place, they tend to be manipulated. Professors are
therefore able to write to the evaluative instrument just as K-12 teachers teach to
the test. Worse still, administrators, because they are removed from the scene of
the action (i.e., the classroom) and because they may not be familiar with the
discipline under review, are not able to judge actual quality. Accordingly, they come
to depend upon over-simplified sampling techniques that are difficult to assess.
A case in point is student evaluations. Each term students are asked to fill
out forms that rate their professors. These are then summed up and administrators
provided with a figure that alleges to measure how well a professor does in
particular areas. The difficulty is that these evaluations are largely popularity
contests. As research shows, instructors who are well liked tend to do better. Those
who are controversial and/or demanding, in contrast, frequently suffer. The upshot
is that effectiveness is distorted. Bureaucrats who see only numbers are unable to
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determine why the scores came out as they did, yet if they reward those with higher
scores, they may encourage professors to go easy on their classes. All in the name of
improving quality by making professors “accountable,” they undermine responsible
behavior. Yet how would they know.
In sum, the bureaucratic and professional models recurrently come into
conflict on college campuses (Delbanco, 2012). What administrators want and what
professors desire are not always compatible. Nor is it clear that the expansion of the
bureaucratic model has produced the benefits attributed to it. To the degree that
professors are denied the ability to supervise their own activities, to this same
degree we may be depriving students of a truly higher education. Colleges, like all
organizations, must impose controls if they are to accomplish their missions, but
this control need not be invested in a traditional bureaucratic chain of command. It
can emanate from the dedication of professors who are at least as interested in
quality learning as are presidents, provosts, deans, etc.
Reconciling Bureaucracy and Professionalism in Academe
The next question is how can the bureaucratic and professional modes of
control be reconciled within the college setting (Taylor, 2010; Hacker and Dreifus,
2010)? Or maybe the question should be: Can these, in fact, be reconciled? At the
moment, the bureaucrats seem to have the upper hand. They are the hierarchical
superiors and their numbers are growing. What is more, legislation originating
from state and local governments continues to encourage further bureaucratization.
As regulations—ostensibly aimed at improving educational outcomes—continue to
multiply, they demand reams of paperwork, which, as might be supposed, are the
province of the administrators. These hierarchical superiors can therefore contend
that they are only doing what needs to be done. They are merely bowing to the
demands of the people as expressed through their political representatives.
College administrators also possess another enormous advantage in vying for
power. Exercising control is, in fact, their job. Issuing orders and then seeing to it
that these are implemented are what they do for a living. Doing this well is
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therefore part of their identity. By well, unfortunately, this does not mean
effectively. It only means with apparent success. Sadly one of the best ways to
achieve this appearance is through “empire-building.” The more people an
administrator supervises and the more programs he or she promulgates, the more
potent this person will seem to be (Parkinson, 1996). This provides the incentive to
make sure professors remain subordinate. It also ensures that many of the
initiatives defended in the name of educational excellence have little to do with
improving academic quality.
How then can the professoriate defend itself from the inroads of a
determined rival? After all, professors do not spend endless hours contemplating
how they can achieve organizational control. For most, the focus of their attention is
on their classrooms and/or their scholarship. Nor is this likely to change. Indeed,
efforts by professors to increase their influence frequently founder on their
bureaucratic innocence. Because they are not immersed in the politics of
administration, they often misread what is possible or even how the possible can be
achieved.
There is, however, an avenue through which professors can defend, and
perhaps expand, their professional control. That pathway is through greater
professionalism (Fein, 2011). The high card faculty members possess is their “selfmotivated expertise.” It is in this that that they are unique. It is therefore this that
enables them to accomplish higher educational objectives more effectively than
others—most notably their administrative superiors. But for this to make itself felt,
they must be genuinely self-motivated experts. If they merely go through the
motions; if they are, for instance, overly concerned with promoting ideological
agendas, they forfeit the social legitimacy upon which their power depends. Society
has delegated college professors considerable power because it is believed that they
are indeed custodians of crucial forms of knowledge. When this is doubted, when it
is widely believed that professors are naïve idealists more interested in promoting
their pet projects than advancing our shared knowledge, they loss the respect of the
public (Kimball, 1990). But it is the public, when it sides with professors, than can
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provide a counterbalance against administrative ambitions. When faculty members
lose sight of this, they abandon the social status upon which their independence is
contingent.
Professionalism possesses a potency that can be maintained only when it is
genuine (Fein, 2014). Only if professors know important things that other do not
know will they be admired. Only when they are truly dedicated to expanding what
they understand and applying it with integrity can they command the respect of
others. To be delegated power, one must be perceived as worthy of it. This is not to
say that contemporary professors no longer care about their professionalism. Most
do. Nevertheless, they must make it plain to others that what they contribute
deserves to be preserved. Moreover, they must strengthen their self-motivated
expertise such that there is no question that it should remain at the heart of higher
education. They, because they are knowledgeable and care about remaining
knowledgeable, should be supported when they make pedagogical decisions. They
must not become ciphers of out-of-touch administrators who are incapable of
replacing what the professors supply.
Conclusion
The bureaucratic and professional models of social control are currently
fighting over the soul of higher education (Ginsgurg, 2011). Both models have
spheres of influence where the manner in which they maintain control is
appropriate to the tasks performed. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic model has been
making inroads into what has been the traditional preserve of a professionalized
professoriate. More man (and woman) power and treasure have been poured into
converting our colleges into a high tech version of industrial corporations
(Christensen and Eyring, 2011). Instead of teaching and scholarship being
strengthened, college faculty members are being treated as unruly children who
must be contained lest they do unspeakable damage. Rather than being regarded as
professional colleagues due the respect and autonomy of their forebears, they are
being brought to heal by efforts to impose “best practices” and “accountability.” Not
only are these attempts unnecessary, but they are counter-productive. Instead of
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enhancing academic quality, by undercutting the very persons most able to provide
it, they reduce what is ostensibly sought.
The virtues of professionalism, especially within academe, do not seem to be
fully appreciated. The nature of a self-motivated expertise, as well as its value in
providing decentralized controls, have been overlooked in the rush to impose
bureaucratic control. That professors who are dedicated to their disciplines can
know more and teach better than instructors shackled by fixed rubrics seems to
have been forgotten. That such professors can also be more responsive to student
needs has also been mistakenly dismissed.
Many of these trends can be countered by again emphasizing the role of
professionalism on our campuses. Rather than reject it in the name of efficiency,
professors, in particular, should embrace its essence and potential. To do less would
soon put us on a course to dismantling higher education as it has been known. The
result would be a glorified form of secondary education that was both ruinously
expensive and muddle-headed. A check would be put on the sort of learning that
only a professionalized professoriate can provide—much to the detriment of all
concerned.
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